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The SLRC South Sudan programme has been working since 2012 to identify and 
understand the realities of livelihoods, access to basic services, and perceptions of 
governance in post-independence South Sudan. In 2013, SLRC conducted research 
in Uror, Nyirol, and Pibor counties to examine the dynamics of service delivery, state-
building and livelihood changes in the context of armed conflict and raiding. Following 
the outbreak of large-scale armed conflict in December 2013, the research was 
adjusted to reflect the shift in the focus aid towards humanitarian action.
This briefing paper summarises findings from the publications of SLRC South Sudan  
over the life of the programme, all of which can be found at: 
www.securelivelihoods.org/South-Sudan. 
International engagement in South(ern) Sudan: A long history
The history of what is now South Sudan is also a history of external intervention, 
broadly including: colonialism under Turco-Egyptian (1821-1899) and Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium rule (1899-1955); rule by a succession of mostly Islamist governments 
in Khartoum (1955-2011); large-scale humanitarian operations during the 1990s 
and 2000s; and unprecedented donor support and investment in ‘state-building’ 
around the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and South Sudan’s 
independence in July 2011. SLRC research explores the evolution of engagement 




 ■ The long history of international engagement in South Sudan has 
been driven and shaped at least as much by global aid trends as 
by the realities of the local context, norms and institutions.
 ■ After the CPA and independence, international actors prioritised 
technical solutions to South Sudan’s development challenges 
and failed to adequately account for the deeply political nature of 
conflict transformation, state-building and aid.
 ■ Renewed warfare led to a shift in aid priorities from state-building 
to humanitarian action, and thus in coordination from central 
institutions to local authorities, yet international engagement 
remained too detached from local contexts and perspective. 
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of mainly Western actors in humanitarian, development 
and state-building programmes leading up to and following 
independence.1 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which ran from 1989 until 
the signing of the CPA, was at the time the world’s largest-
ever coordinated humanitarian relief operation. It was the 
first humanitarian operation to negotiate access to deliver 
relief inside an active conflict zone, by way of the ‘Ground 
Rules’ agreements signed with the Government of Sudan in 
Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A), the dominant armed group in the south. OLS 
operated throughout the rest of the civil war, using various aid 
delivery channels to varying degrees of success. After the CPA, 
large-scale aid did not end so much as shift focus: although 
some emergency relief continued, aid agencies and donors 
shifted their resources and rhetoric towards conflict recovery 
and development – the state-building agenda – in the newly 
independent South Sudan.
Tremendous effort and donor resources have gone into aid 
and institution-building in the emerging country. Yet, with 
the re-emergence of armed conflict since December 2013, 
South Sudan’s history of large-scale armed violence and 
humanitarian crisis now appears to be repeating itself. 
Global trends, not local developments, drive aid 
decisions
Just as the OLS period offered new opportunities for aid 
providers to improve on their past experiences in the Horn 
1 Other forms of international engagement – i.e. the engagement of 
neighbouring and regional actors, including the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development, or of non-Western donors and trade partners such as China 
and Turkey, or investment from the oil industry and other investors – are not 
the focus of SLRC research.
of Africa and elsewhere, the period after the CPA and 
independence offered similar openings for new approaches. 
South Sudan was viewed by many as a clean slate on which 
to test a number of new aid and coordination modalities. The 
country came into being at the same time as the New Deal for 
Engagement in Fragile States and, like that agreement, was 
viewed by many in the  aid world as a new chance to make up 
for aid mistakes of the past, including shortfalls in funding and 
coordination, lack of support to central institutions, an overly 
technical approach and over-emphasis on the views of external 
actors. The New Deal instead emphasises country leadership 
and ownership of development agendas, though as the South 
Sudan case has painfully illustrated, it does not contain back-
up plans for response to a failure of that model.
Donors to the emerging nation-state pursued core support to 
ministries and government departments along with new aid 
coordination mechanisms on an unprecedented scale. Many 
of these programmes fell short of their objectives. The joint 
mechanisms, including the Joint Donor Team, the Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF) and others were never fully supported in 
terms of either financial resources or political commitment, 
and were bypassed altogether by those donors with a 
preference for bilateral aid, principally the United States. When 
the MDTF formally closed in mid-2013 after seven years of 
operation, many of the projects had failed to meet their targets, 
largely due to operational constraints and inefficiencies as well 
as poor coordination and underfunding.2 
The commitment to the New Deal spurred donors to support 
South Sudanese-led efforts, but it is unclear whether those 
external actors had concrete plans for recognising and 
2 Fafo (2013) Independent Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund – 
South Sudan (MDTF-SS), Final Report. 25 July 2013. Juba: Fafo Institute for 
Applied International Studies.
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addressing the potential pitfalls of working with nascent 
government institutions or even the longer-standing 
institutions that had metamorphosed during the civil war. The 
problems included the slow pace of change in systems and 
staff capacity, as well as the potential for corruption or a slide 
back into conflict. With the descent into armed violence after 
December 2013, many donors became reluctant to work 
closely with the South Sudanese government. Thus, the donor 
response to South Sudan’s return to war illustrates a crucial 
lack of planning for the possibility that New Deal countries 
might return to conflict. 
Moreover, international donors and other actors often did not 
effectively incorporate the plethora of South Sudanese 
institutions beyond the state, including NGOs, civil society, 
and traditional socio-political structures and individuals, many 
of which were already working on a variety of governance, 
relief and development initiatives. As our research has 
repeatedly shown, many of these were ignored in favour of 
international agencies and NGOs, while others were funded 
too optimistically. In the rush to distribute funds, some donors 
tended to prioritise those recipients who could meet their 
complex financing and reporting structures, regardless of 
other issues or criteria. This gap led to wrong assumptions, 
competition for funding, and almost certainly to the misuse of 
aid funds for patronage and personal enrichment. These 
practices continued despite donor-funded analyses pointing to 
many of these risks, which suggests that such analyses were 
under-utilised.  
Technical solutions won’t fix political problems
Despite the fact that the New Deal emphasises the political 
aspects of post-conflict recovery, many donors and 
international agencies failed to adequately consider the 
complexity and deeply political nature of South Sudan. Instead, 
most of the numerous aid projects approached the newly 
independent South Sudan with only fairly narrow technical 
solutions to its many problems. For example, multiple agencies 
were working to address armed conflict related to cattle, a 
critical problem in several states in the new country. Some 
programmes operated on implicit assumptions that cattle 
raiding and related fighting were mainly based on resource 
scarcity, particularly over grazing land and access to water. 
The realities, however, were much more complicated: in the 
case of Jonglei State – the locus of most of SLRC research – 
conflict and raiding stemmed from multiple intersecting drivers 
including national political dynamics, political contestation 
within the state, competition between different age sets3, bride 
wealth and the demonstration of power and material wealth 
– of which cattle are an important manifestation.  No single 
technical project-based approach, be it agricultural investment 
or localised infrastructure construction, could adequately 
address the underlying political dimensions. 
3 Age sets are a key social category for some ethnic groups, creating a 
shared identity among people of similar age within the larger group.
South Sudanese respondents also criticised development 
projects as isolated, piecemeal, and unsustainable. Numerous 
schools, clinic facilities and boreholes were built, for example, 
without a realistic plan for government institutions to assume 
responsibility for their sustained operation. Functional 
institutions require ongoing staffing, training and procurement 
processes, dedicated and stable budgets and budget 
management infrastructure; yet, in much of South Sudan, there 
was a dearth of local capacity and, in some cases political  will. 
In retrospect it is clear that institution-building was going  to 
be a complex, long-term process, but it’s not clear that 
international actors – or perhaps more importantly, the budget 
cycles to which they were beholden – incorporated a realistic 
view of the challenges that were likely to arise along the way.
Furthermore, setting priorities and planning and allocating 
funding are highly political endeavours, as these processes 
relate to control of resources, governance and accountability. 
Programmes engaging with these political aspects – for 
instance, by supporting political dialogue, governance, 
budgetary accountability and civic education – exist in South 
Sudan, but they are inherently slow processes and their impact 
is difficult to measure. As such, they are often at odds with 
many donors’ need to be able to prove that aid money is well-
spent. ‘Value’, in this context, is very difficult to define, much 
less quantify.   
Real participation remains out of reach for most South 
Sudanese
A corollary concern to the overemphasis on technical 
development projects, voiced by respondents both before and 
after the resumption of armed conflict, is that communities 
have only rarely been involved in decision-making about their 
needs and priorities. Many projects implemented in South 
Sudan since the CPA era seemed to have their conceptual 
origins everywhere but in the communities intended to benefit 
from them. Instead, ‘best practices’ were brought in from 
other countries, or programmes were devised in Juba. While  it 
is obviously more expedient to bring in a preconceived (and 
funded) project, a central problem of this approach is that 
it risks addressing the wrong issues or directing resources 
away from those most in need. In addition, the longevity of 
programmes seems entirely reliant upon donor funding cycles 
and has little to do with their success or community feedback. 
Many respondents, particularly those in remote areas, 
seemed generally baffled by the capriciousness of the aid their 
communities received, in terms of its utter lack of connection 
to local needs, perceptions, or the rhythms of livelihoods. 
SLRC research consistently noted that the opportunity for 
community ‘participation’ and input into government or NGO 
programmes since the CPA was limited – even in best-case 
scenarios – to being informed and perhaps having chiefs and 
other local authorities help to direct targeting of predetermined 
interventions. Only approximately 15% of respondents in 
Jonglei and 20% in Upper Nile reported in 2012 that they were 
‘satisfied’ with planning processes around basic services. 
Our research found that relations between international 
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actors and local authorities have reportedly grown closer 
since the renewal of conflict – at the same time as those 
with central state institution have soured – yet these seem 
to remain largely in the service of aid delivery rather than its 
design. Authorities and their constituents still lack systematic 
opportunities to participate in broader needs assessments, 
which has a real impact on programme design and operation. 
Conclusions and implications
South Sudan and the international actors involved with 
it once again find themselves at a crossroads, with a 
transitional government in flux, strained relations between 
major donors and the UN with the government, a contested 
peace agreement, tremendous displacement of the 
population, and ever-increasing humanitarian needs in a very 
challenging and increasingly insecure working environment. It 
is a time to pay close attention to the lessons emerging from 
many years of international engagement in South(ern) Sudan. 
The importance of adapting international engagement to  
the context – as proclaimed by the New Deal – requires 
multiple mechanisms that would structure that engagement 
quite differently from the past. International actors must 
have access to rigorous historical, political and contextual 
analyses. They must have adequate means, incentives, space 
and time to understand those analyses and apply them to 
their ongoing activities. It also calls for adequate knowledge 
management mechanisms to ensure that lessons from 
previous periods such as OLS are not only produced, but truly 
learned, and that knowledge is transferred within the context 
of high personnel fluctuation.  
Conflict transformation processes, state-building and 
international aid are highly political, and thus constrained 
by politics. In South Sudan, this could be done, for example, 
through a regular analysis of the political dynamics and the 
political economy of the ongoing armed conflict, and working 
with analysis in new ways to make sure it is utilised. It also 
requires critical reflection on the impact  of international 
support itself on the political and conflict dynamics. More 
comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of international 
engagement on longer timescales should further enhance 
understandings of the interface between aid and conflict.
New modes of engagement – 
including ‘more local, more 
flexible, more responsive 
funding to local priorities’ and 
‘more devolved authority to 
spend and spend quickly’4 – 
might make for engagement 
that is better adapted to 
the changing context and 
the priorities of the aid 
recipients. Implementing 
partners that work in this 
highly dynamic context 
would also benefit from more 
flexible approaches, with the 
ability to adapt to changing 
circumstances and redirect 
funding more quickly and smoothly. 
At the time of writing, the status of the peace  agreement, the 
composition of Transitional Government of  National Unity 
and the strategies of international actors are all very much 
in flux. In some ways, this situation is not new but rather 
a reiteration and continuation of past dynamics. Thus the 
conclusions and recommendations emerging from SLRC 
research are also not new. They take on renewed urgency, 
however, as there is no doubt that international actors 
will continue to be called upon to engage with the young 
independent state they so enthusiastically helped shepherd 
into existence. It is imperative that the mistakes of the past 
are not repeated (again).
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